

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~ 12834022

I, 3 (Final)

EIGHTEENTH MEETING OFUNITED STATES COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE BOARD8 January 1947SUMMARYAction To Be Taken by Board MembersAction to be taken

1. Make necessary arrangements to send a party of U.S. technical experts to Canada to aid in the selection of sites for new Canadian intercept stations. (See page 7.)
2. Prepare a study of the evolution of the USCIB-USCICG Organization and the Army-Navy C.I. Coordination Plan for presentation to General Chamberlin. (See page 19.)
3. Draft a mutually agreeable U.S.-Canadian C.I. Agreement and obtain approval of this draft from their respective superiors on USCIB. This working draft when approved by the Army and Navy members of USCIB is to be considered approved ipso facto by the other members. (See page 25.)

ResponsibilityCoordinator of
Joint OperationsCaptain J. N.
Wenger, USNColonel H. G.
Hayes
Captain J. N.
Wenger, USNAction To Be Taken by Secretariat

1. Make available to the ID representative, who attended the Seventeenth USCIB meeting, the tentative minutes of that meeting for correction. (See page 7.)
2. Circulate as a fait accompli to the members of USCIB the working draft of the U.S.-Canadian C.I. Agreement which is to be prepared by Colonel Hayes and Captain Wenger and approved by their respective superiors on USCIB. (See page 25.)

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS
PANEL, E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP NO. 2004-005~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~FINALEIGHTEENTH MEETINGof theUNITED STATES COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE BOARD8 JANUARY 1947PRESIDENT:

CIG: Lt. General H. S. Vandenberg, Chairman
STATE: Mr. William Eddy
ARMY: Major General S. J. Chamberlin
Colonel H. G. Hayes
Captain W. G. Campbell, Secretariat
NAVY: Rear Admiral Thomas D. Inglis
Rear Admiral E. E. Stone
Lt1 C. T. R. Adams, Secretariat
FBI: Mr. Edward A. Tamm

ALSO PRESENT:

STATE: Mr. E. E. Huddleson, Jr.
Mr. W. P. Armstrong, Jr.
ARMY: Colonel C. W. Clarke
NAVY: Captain C. F. Espe
Captain J. N. Wenger
CIG: Commander R. L. Taylor

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

The Eighteenth meeting of the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board was held in Room 5104, New War Department Building at 1515, 8 January 1947. In accordance with the instruction of the Chairman, no agenda had been prepared.

GENERAL VANDENBERG opened the meeting by stating that no agenda had been prepared because there had been indications that misunderstanding had arisen in connection with matters previously discussed. He said that it was the purpose of this meeting to clarify the intent and position of all members concerned with respect to those problems and also, that he wished to report to the Board the results of his recent conversations with Mr. Crean, the Canadian C.I. delegate. He commented that a report on these conversations is particularly appropriate in view of the fact that Mr. Crean advanced some new ideas which cast a different light on the attitude and feeling of Canada toward C.I. collaboration with the United States.

At this point Commander Taylor read the following brief of the conversation held between Mr. Crean and General Vandenberg on 6 January 1947: "1. Discussion.

"Mr. Crean opened the discussion by stating that Admiral Inglis had intimated to him in Ottawa that it might be desirable to know the Canadian attitude toward a U.S.-Canadian C.I. Agreement. Mr. Crean went on to say, in effect, that while offhand he had no specific objection to an agreement, he did not quite see the need for it.

"Mr. Crean went on to state that there is a real need for a conference between U.S.-Canadian intercept specialists fully empowered to speak for their respective services. He said such a conference should take place in Ottawa, with the view to deciding location of projected Canadian intercept stations so that they will be of maximum mutual benefit.

"When asked what he specifically had in mind with his request of 26 September 1946, Mr. Crean replied that Canada wants to feel free to ask for any special intelligence produced by U. S. centers. He added as an example that they had recently requested French diplomatic translations from LSIC and were receiving them. When asked if Canada felt that any and all C.I. material could be supplied by them to the U. S. without any agreement to support such exchange, he answered in the affirmative.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

"When asked if Canada would be willing to supply collateral material for C. I. work without an agreement he replied that he considered that a somewhat different problem and would have to check with Ottawa. He asked to know at what point we would notify the British of negotiations for a U.S.-Canadian agreement. He stated that he would like to know this so as not to tip our hands. The Chairman replied that such notification would have to take place when an agreement acceptable to Canada had been mutually explored and agreed upon but not yet concluded.

"The Chairman concluded the discussion by stating he would put Mr. Crean's views before USCIB and might possibly be able to give Mr. Crean further information subsequently. Accordingly he made an appointment to see Mr. Crean again at 1400 Thursday, 9 January 1947.

"2. Conclusions.

"a. Canada sees no need for a U.S.-Canadian agreement but is not opposed to it.

"b. Canada wants a technical conference on location of Canadian intercept stations.

"c. Canada wants availability of all U.S. Special Intelligence for consumer as well as technical use.

"d. Canada can and does get from U. K. sources some of the results of U. S. effort, and could conceivably obtain all U. S. Special Intelligence from that source.

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Commander, USN
CIG Representative on USCICC"

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked if there were any questions or comments on the report of the conversation. He said that he was anxious to receive guidance from the members of USCIB, either individually or collectively.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked what should be the extent of comments at this stage.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he wished to determine whether, in the opinion of the members of USCIB, the action of the Chairman, as reflected by the report of his conversations with Mr. Crean, does, in fact, represent the views of all USCIB members.

ADMIRAL INGLIS commented that there was one minor point which he might bring out and that is, in his opinion, the British should be informed at a little earlier stage in the negotiations than is contemplated in the brief of the conversation.

COLONEL HAYES remarked that it is not clear from the report of the conversation whether Canada wants all the Bulletin now. COMMANDER TAYLOR said that Mr. Crean had stated that Canada cannot possibly hope to absorb all of the material which could be made available. He said that Canada, however, does want to feel free to ask for anything that is needed.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that this brings up a point which must be considered, and suggested that it be sent to USCIB for study.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he had gathered from the report of the Chairman's earlier conversation with Mr. Crean that the question demands an early answer.

GENERAL VANDENBERG confirmed this impression.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that the U.S. should give to Canada only that material which will increase Canada's ability to render aid to the U.S. C.I. effort.

GENERAL VANDENBERG commented that it is interesting to note that Mr. Crean had said that, initially, the U.S. can expect to receive very little return from the Canadian C.I. effort. At first Canada intends to set up the intercept stations and secure the necessary operating funds, and eventually the U.S. will derive very definite benefits. He added his belief that USCIB should encourage the development of the Canadian C.I. organization.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN again said that, in his opinion, the U.S. should supply Canada with only such items as will encourage the Canadian C.I. effort---nothing more.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

ADMIRAL INGLIS expressed the view that the amount of U.S. aid to the Canadian C.I. effort should not be governed by the expected return on the investment but, on the contrary, the U.S. should lend aid if for nothing more than to strengthen the Canadian C.I. position as a contribution to hemisphere defense. He said there should be no consideration of the quid pro quo.

GENERAL VANDENBERG again asked if any member had any comments to make that would offer guidance to the Chairman in future conversations with Mr. Crean.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he could agree with the desire to help Canada but in implementing the decision, he believed a written agreement would be necessary to protect U. S. interests.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he would like to exercise a Chairman's prerogative and settle first the question of the desire to aid Canada, and asked if he, as Chairman, could tell Mr. Crean that the desired support would be forthcoming.

COMMANDER TAYLOR said that USCIGC has made recommendations along this line.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked whether Mr. Crean could be told that the Bulletin would be made available to Canada.

ADMIRAL STONE said that the question of a written agreement must be considered before a final decision can be made on the extent of the desire to aid Canada.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he could not concur in any proposal to make available to Canada the Bulletin or any of the U.S. general files without first concluding a written U.S.-Canadian C.I. agreement.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN reiterated his opinion that U.S. self interest should be the motivating spirit in determining the extent of U.S. aid to the Canadian C.I. effort.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed but added that this self interest should take the long range viewpoint.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he could concur with this sentiment if it is conceded that the U.S. in helping Canada also helps itself.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that USCIB must be "hard boiled" and selfish in this whole matter.

ADMIRAL INGLIS remarked that it is the established policy of the U.S. to foster Canada.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

TOP SECRET CREAM

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN commented that there are some things that Canada just does not need to know and that the U.S. should studiously refrain from supplying such information. ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then asked for suggestions as to the machinery which would be needed to select at this end the material which should be supplied. He asked if the members considered it advisable to have each case referred to USCIB for decision.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that the character and importance of the issue at stake would seem to justify such a procedure.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that with a written agreement he would be willing to let Canada make the decision as to her needs.

GENERAL VANDENBERG commented that it seems appropriate to state here that during his conversation with Mr. Crean, the latter inadvertently, or so it seemed, revealed that Canada obtains from the British some Special Intelligence produced by the U.S. He stated that since this situation exists it would certainly behoove the U.S. to be realistic and to supply this Special Intelligence directly to Canada, thereby strengthening Canadian good will toward the U.S. and reaping any other benefits which might accrue.

ADMIRAL STONE agreed with the opinion expressed by General Vandenberg and expressed the belief that the British will give to Canada whatever Special Intelligence they feel Canada should have. ADMIRAL STONE then inquired whether Great Britain, under the terms of the BRUSA Agreement, can pass Special Intelligence produced by the U.S. to other Dominions in the British Commonwealth.

COLONEL HAYES stated that, though he couldn't be positive on the point, he believed that such action is prohibited by the terms of the BRUSA Agreement.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that this possibility had caused him some concern and that he had been advised by his Staff that the BRUSA Agreement does not restrict Great Britain's dissemination of Special Intelligence to Canada alone, and added that he felt reassured by Colonel Hayes' statement.

COLONEL HAYES said that he had just expressed his opinion of the matter, but that if his opinion was incorrect he believed that the BRUSA Agreement should be changed to provide this protection.

CAPTAIN WENGER commented that the Director, LSIC had told him that Great Britain is obliged to pass to Canada all "necessary" information.

TOP SECRET CREAM

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

MR. HUDDLESON said that as regards dissemination, the BRUSA Agreement provides that dissemination by either party will be made to U.S. recipients only as approved by USCIB; to British Empire recipients and to Dominion recipients, other than Canadian, only as approved by the London Sigint Board; and to Canadian recipients as approved either by USCIB or by the London Sigint Board.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that, in view of these provisions, USCIB should be more lenient in its consideration of the extent of dissemination of Special Intelligence to Canada. He then asked whether it was USCIB's feeling that U.S. collaboration with Canada should be as broad as that currently existing between the U.S. and Great Britain.

ADMIRAL INGLIS restated his position to the effect that after a written agreement between the U.S. and Canada is concluded he would be willing to let Canada decide her own needs.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he thought that USCIB should first determine what Canada wants before committing the U.S. to any policy.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the Canadian Comint Center is presently engaged in an effort to obtain an appropriation of funds and that it needs to be able to advise the Canadian budgetary authorities that when the Canadian Comint organization is built up, active collaboration with U.S. Comint authorities is assured. He asked if the Chairman might assure Mr. Crean of USCIB's support of the Canadian C.I. effort; and said that if this were agreed, details of implementation could be worked out later.

ADMIRAL INGLIS, recalling the discussion at the last meeting, said that he was not sure that USCIB can reach a decision on the advisability of having a written U.S.-Canadian C.I. agreement.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he would like to mention at this point that the attitude of Mr. Crean, the Canadian representative, toward a U.S.-Canadian C.I. agreement should, in his opinion, have little weight on the deliberations of USCIB. He then said that he would like to leave this point for a moment and discuss another issue which had arisen during his conversation with Mr. Crean. He stated that Canada has plans for an extensive program of intercept station construction and, as yet, has not decided on the physical location for all of these new installations. He commented that Mr. Crean has extended an invitation for U.S. technical experts to visit Canada to aid in the selection of sites for the new Canadian installations. GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that a party of U.S. technical experts be sent on this mission and asked if any member of USCIB had any objection to this proposal.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

COMMANDER TAYLOR suggested that implementation of the proposal would probably be a function of the Coordinator of Joint Operations.

COLONEL HAYES agreed and all members concurred that it is advisable to send to Canada as soon as practicable a party of U.S. technical experts to aid in the selection of sites for new Canadian intercept stations.

DECISION: It was agreed that it is advisable to send in the near future a party of U.S. technical experts to Canada to aid in the selection of sites for new Canadian intercept stations. USCIB designated the Coordinator to make the necessary arrangements.

GENERAL VANDENBERG, turning to a new topic, read that portion of the tentative minutes of the 17th USCIB Meeting, wherein the War Department representative, according to the minutes, stated that he was not at liberty to discuss whether the I.D., WDGS, has information not available to the Navy Department, which leads the former to oppose a written Canadian-U.S. C.I. Agreement.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he believed he was conveying the sentiment of most members of the Board in saying that the Board feels that it is handling the highest category of secret information and is therefore at a loss to understand the statement attributed to the I.D. representative. In view of this, he asked if the I.D. member would like to reconsider the statement as it appeared in the tentative minutes.

COLONEL CLARKE said that the statement in the tentative minutes is a misinterpretation. He stated that he had said at the previous meeting that he supports Colonel Hayes' view in opposing a written agreement and that the War Department has no information at this time other than that presented by the Coordinator.

DECISION: GENERAL VANDENBERG directed the Secretariat to make available to Colonel Clarke for correction the tentative minutes in which the above mentioned misinterpretation is recorded.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that another problem had arisen which he believed advisable to discuss at this time in order to save time on the USCICC level and that is the authority of the Coordinator of Joint Operations. He made reference to the memorandum of 22 November 1946 from the Coordinator of Joint Operations to the Chairman, USCICC, and asked Captain Wenger to state the problem which had arisen.

CAPTAIN WENGER reported that the matter had arisen in connection with the memorandum which the Coordinator of Joint Operations had written to the Chairman of USCICC concerning priority problems and also in connection with statements made by Army members at the recent USCICC meeting during the discussion of the [REDACTED] monitoring program. He said that the Army members had stated that the Coordinator had no directive power in the matter of assigning intercept tasks. As a result of this opinion

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

expressed by the Army, which seemed to bear out the Army position as expressed in the Coordinator of Joint Operations' 22 November 1946 memorandum, he stated that he felt the subject should be discussed by USCIB in order to clarify the apparent divergent viewpoints between the Army and the Navy.

CAPTAIN WENGER stated, that in response to a proposed Army plan for post-war coordination of Army-Navy C.I. activities, the Navy members of ANCICC submitted an alternative proposal, dated 30 May 1945, which was submitted to ANCICC on 13 June 1945. He said that during the discussions of the two proposals it had been revealed that the Army members desired that a single individual should be empowered to direct the joint projects, while the Navy members had favored a Coordinator rather than a Director. He said that the Navy members conceded the point and had agreed to a Coordinator with defined functions, and that as a result of the preliminary discussions, the paper entitled, "Duties and Responsibilities of the Coordinator of Joint Operations," dated 5 April 1946 and adopted by USCIB on 22 April 1946, resulted. He then read the following two paragraphs of that agreement:

"1. The Coordinator of Joint Operations shall function, as shown in Inclosure (A), under the control of STANCIB-STANCICC as executor of policies and directives formulated by STANCIB-STANCICC for the allocation of tasks for such intercept and processing capacities as may be made available for joint use by ASA and OP-20-G, and for coordination of all joint projects with other U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies. The operating heads of ASA and OP-20-G will be responsible to the Coordinator for accomplishment of the tasks allocated by him.

"2. The Army will continue to be responsible for work on military and military attaché systems and the Navy for work on naval and naval attaché systems. Work on other systems will be a joint responsibility and shared accordingly. It is expected that a certain percentage of the intercept and processing capacities will be reserved and controlled entirely by ASA and OP-20-G respectively for the performance of the strictly military or naval tasks. The remaining capacities will be placed at the disposal of the Coordinator for accomplishing the other tasks as he may direct. In the utilization of the joint capacities thus made available to him to accomplish joint tasks directed by STANCIB-STANCICC, he shall be guided by the principle of (1) obtaining the maximum of intelligence in the minimum of time, (2) maintaining technical continuity, and (3) providing continued training of the personnel of both communication intelligence organizations on all types of communication intelligence problems.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

It is not required that all capacities allocated to the Coordinator necessarily be used on problems of joint interest. For example, it may become desirable for naval supplementary radio stations to intercept traffic of a purely military nature in which the Navy would have no interest other than furnishing assistance."

CAPTAIN WENGER stated that it is the view of the Navy members that these paragraphs are specific and the Navy considers the Coordinator of Joint Operations to have control of the facilities made available to him; but it appears the Army does not share this viewpoint. CAPTAIN WENGER then read the following memorandum:

"MEMORANDUM FOR COORDINATOR OF JOINT OPERATIONS, 24 October 1946

Subject: Priority Problems

Reference: Minutes of 33rd Meeting of USCICC

"1. In the course of the last meeting of USCICC, a discussion arose as to the handling of priority problems resulting from personnel shortages. One of the aspects considered was the shifting of personnel from Chinese to BOURBON or BOURBON satellite problems, in view of the more promising prospects in these latter fields.

"2. It was recognized that the JPAG, with the assistance of representatives from the State, War and Navy Department, was already endeavoring to solve these problems on a working level. However, it was felt that possibly they were not being considered by this group on a broad enough basis. The members of USCICC agreed that efforts should be continued to solve the problems on a working level but that contemplated changes in priority which might require major shifts in emphasis should be referred to USCICC for decision. As one means of establishing priorities on a broad basis it was suggested that the requirements of the member organizations of USCIB might be resolved by means of special monthly meetings of their representatives.

"3. In accordance with a decision of the members of USCICC, the Chairman is submitting the foregoing remarks to you for information and comment.

/s/ J.N. Wenger
/t/ J.N. WENGER
Captain, USN"

He added that the question of priorities had been raised by the State Department representative on USCICC and then read the following reply to the above memorandum:

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, USCICC

22 November 1946

SUBJECT: Priority Problems

"1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 24 October 1946, same subject as above, wherein it is stated that 'contemplated changes in priority which might require major shifts in emphasis should be referred to USCICC for decision.'

"2. The Joint Memorandum of 10 March 1945 signed by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations, authorizing the establishment of USCIB (then ANCIB) states in part, 'With respect to all matters pertaining to the collection, research, production, compilation, dissemination and security of communication intelligence, the Board will (a) Coordinate the plans and operations of the communication intelligence organizations of the Army and Navy.' (underscoring supplied.) This 'charter' memorandum does not establish USCIB as an authority competent to cut across Army or Navy command channels. Changes in priority and major shifts in emphasis are clearly a command responsibility. It is felt that, in the last analysis, such matters must necessarily remain a matter for decision within the War Department in the case of Army Security Agency and the Navy Department in the case of Supplementary Activities.

"3. Since no organization can properly perform its mission if the principle of unity of command is set aside, the Coordinator of Joint Operations cannot concur in the proposal that 'major shifts in emphasis should be referred to USCICC for decision.' The member agencies of USCICC are not equal partners in the conduct of communication intelligence operations. The War and Navy Departments, as the active agents, must reserve to themselves decisions which affect the actual conduct of operations.

/s/ Harold G. Hayes
/t/ HAROLD G. HAYES
Colonel, Signal Corps
Coordinator of Joint Operations"

CAPTAIN WENGER stated that since this reply seemed to agree with the opinion expressed by the Army during the discussion of the [REDACTED] Monitoring program at the last USCICC meeting, the Navy members felt that the apparent divergence of viewpoints should be reconciled. He said that it had been agreed that the Army and Navy would retain a certain portion of their C.I. facilities for their own use, and that the remainder would be placed at the disposal of the Coordinator, but that the Army members

E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

now seem to disagree with this and to question the authority of USCIB. He said that the Navy members take the view that USCIB, as originally established, did not provide the direction desired by the Chief of Staff, Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations, but that a subsequent exchange of correspondence between these officials extended the function of the Board and culminated in the Army-Navy C.I. coordination plan of 5 April 1946.

CAPTAIN WENGER then read the following excerpts from the minutes of the 11th STANCIB meeting of 15 February 1946:

"It is the intent of the proposed plan to retain complete Navy and Army responsibility for work on naval and military systems respectively. Diplomatic and other communication activities will be considered a joint project and will come under the direction of the proposed Coordinator. He recommended that the basic proposal be accepted in principle by STANCIB and that General Corderman and Captain Wenger be directed to prepare the necessary details for its implementation and to make specific recommendations regarding the selection of a Coordinator."

.

"As regards General Clarke's suggestion that the Coordinator and his staff might replace STANCICC, Admiral Stone indicated that, although the Coordinator should receive direction from STANCIB, it will be advisable to retain STANCICC as an advisory and coordinating body."

.

"General Vandenberg suggested that, in view of the above discussion, the proposed relationship between STANCICC, its subcommittees, and the Coordinator be left unchanged, but that the chart be redrafted to indicate that the Coordinator will be directly responsible to the Board. This could be accomplished by (1) placing STANCIB and STANCICC in the same box, or (2) adding a line of direct authority between STANCIB and the Coordinator. It was agreed that the latter should be effected."

.

"General Corderman pointed out that, prior to further consideration of details, STANCIB should indicate the extent to which the Coordinator will be authorized to act as a 'director' in behalf of the Board."

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

CAPTAIN WENGER concluded by stating that it was felt at the time, that the paper on "Duties and Responsibilities of the Coordinator" of 5 April 1946 was in agreement with the ideas expressed in the above excerpts.

GENERAL VANDENBERG commented that the basic question here seems to resolve itself into a definition of the word "coordination." He expressed his view that the Coordinator cannot coordinate unless he has directive power to coordinate, and asked for opinions from other members.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN requested that the problem be submitted to him in writing for study since he had not had an opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts involved.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that, briefly the facts are that, under the plan, the Army and the Navy placed at the disposal of the Coordinator certain C.I. facilities in accordance with the wishes of the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, who, according to his understanding, wanted to derive the maximum benefit from the operations at Army Security Agency and Navy Communications Annex. It was agreed that the Army would retain a certain portion of its C.I. facilities for its own use and the Navy would do likewise. The remaining facilities of the Army and the Navy were to be placed at the disposal of the Coordinator of Joint Operations. He said that it now appears that when the Coordinator of Joint Operations attempts to "direct" he is told that he can recommend but cannot direct. He concluded by stating that when either the Army or the Navy does not abide by the provisions of the plan, the word "coordination" becomes an empty one.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that Navy had not questioned authority of the Coordinator of Joint Operations.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he was not alluding to specific instances but only outlining the broad problems.

ADMIRAL STONE stated his interpretation that the word "coordination" means control, and expressed the view that the Coordinator should not receive any interference from the Army or the Navy in carrying out his duties.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed that the Coordinator should be free to handle those facilities which have been allotted to him, and asked the opinion of the other Board members as to whether this is a fair contention.

CAPTAIN WENGER said that he would like to point out that his comments were not by way of criticism but were merely an effort to obtain clarification.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked if any real problems have arisen.

ADMIRAL STONE commented that the time is approaching when the Navy will take over the job of Coordinator and he would like to have the question of the Coordinator's authority fully decided and all doubt removed.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked if the Coordinator has anything to do with those facilities which have not been declared for joint use.

ADMIRAL STONE replied that the Coordinator is concerned only with the facilities the Army and Navy have placed at his disposal.

COLONEL HAYES stated that he would like to express the views of the incumbent Coordinator of Joint Operations. He said the present Coordinator wears two hats. He is in command of the Army Security Agency and he is also Coordinator of Joint Operations. He stated that he would frankly admit that the paper which outlines the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator goes further than he considers advisable. He said that the Chief, Army Security Agency, must retain complete control of the facilities and personnel of ASA.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Colonel Hayes' opinion as to the difference between coordination and control.

COLONEL HAYES replied that he believed coordination would be the correct term for use in describing discussions and considerations of what personnel and facilities are available and that the word "control" should be used to describe the authority to exercise command over those personnel and facilities.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked what can be done after the Coordinator of Joint Operations makes a decision, and added the question whether Colonel Hayes considered the Navy to be bound by the Coordinator of Joint Operations' orders.

COLONEL HAYES replied that the Navy should not be bound by such orders, but should exercise all executive control itself.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked whether this would include the situation where Army and Navy facilities have been turned over to the Coordinator of Joint Operations as excess.

COLONEL HAYES said that it is not correct to refer to those facilities of the Army and Navy which were placed at the disposal of the Coordinator as being in excess of the needs of the Army and Navy. Findings at this stage show no excess facilities or personnel. He went on to state that as Chief, Army Security Agency, he takes orders from the Director of Intelligence, WDGS.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Colonel Hayes if he felt that the Director of Intelligence rather than USCIB is his boss.

COLONEL HAYES replied in the affirmative and added that he must use the facilities at his disposal to perform missions assigned by the Director of Intelligence. He remarked that the discussion of this matter thus far sounds as though there has been a great deal of difficulty when actually there hasn't been. He said that allocations have been made in a most amicable fashion and that in some instances the Army is covering circuits of purely Navy interest and in others the Navy is copying traffic of interest only to the Army. He said that as Coordinator he had been very careful to avoid infringing upon Navy command prerogatives.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Colonel Hayes if this policy of being careful to avoid offending was considered by him to be in the best interest of the Joint effort.

COLONEL HAYES replied that he believed it to be since the friction which would likely result from any other course of action would not justify the possible benefit derived. He said that available facilities cannot be grouped into baskets with one basket for Army, one for Navy, and one at the disposal of the Coordinator because it is necessary to continuously take from one and add to another in order to meet a given daily situation.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Colonel Hayes if he were now referring to tasks of a purely military nature.

COLONEL HAYES replied that he was speaking of the whole C.I. intercept field. He said that it is not possible to have a hard and fast allocation of these intercept facilities but the officers in command of Army Security Agency and of Supplementary Activities must be able to make shifts in allocation as the situation arises. If part of the facilities are in a pool, the above mentioned officers must have authority to withdraw certain facilities from the pool to meet a particular demand.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that, as Chairman, the comments which have been made thus far indicate to him a need for a full discussion of this problem because under the situation outlined by Colonel Hayes, both the State Department and FBI are shut out completely.

ADMIRAL STONE said that it is true that the Coordinator reports to USCIB but that when the Army-Navy C.I. Coordination Plan was established, the Chief Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army relinquished to USCIB some of their command responsibility.

COLONEL HAYES disagreed and cited that portion of the USCIB Organizational Bulletin II which sets forth the authority for the existence of

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

USCIB, namely, the joint memorandum signed by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations. He made particular reference to paragraph 2 of the joint memorandum which reads, "With respect to all matters pertaining to the collection, research, production, compilation, dissemination and security of communications intelligence, the Board will

- (a) Coordinate the plans and operations of the communication organizations of the Army and Navy.
- (b) Formulate joint agreements as to procedures pertinent thereto.
- (c) Negotiate and coordinate with other intelligence organizations."

COLONEL HAYES stated that the verbs used in these paragraphs indicate that no executive authority was extended but that USCIB would operate through the established command channels of the two services. He said that the Coordinator is therefore required to function through these established command channels. He added that this fact is born out by the succeeding paragraph of the letter of authority which states in part: "The authority of the Board, outlined in paragraph 2, will be subject to the approval of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army and the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations." He remarked that this statement further restricts the authority of USCIB and clearly implies that normal command channels within the two services would be employed in the conduct of C.I. operations.

ADMIRAL STONE said that Colonel Hayes had spoken of there being no excess facilities but that he had understood that those facilities which had been placed at the disposal of the Coordinator by the Army and the Navy were to be considered as being in a common pool and that such facilities would be used as the Coordinator directed.

ADMIRAL STONE then cited a passage from the minutes of the STANCIB-STANCIOC meeting of 15 February 1946 and commented that the authority of the Coordinator, as outlined therein, had been approved by all members at that time. He said that Colonel Hayes had performed well as Coordinator and that he would like to see the C.I. Coordination Plan continued.

COLONEL HAYES agreed that the paper on the Duties and Responsibilities of the Coordinator implies more authority than he thought existed or had attempted to exercise.

GENERAL VAIDENBERG commented that this discussion had brought out both sides of the question for the information of General Chamberlin and added that General Chamberlin should be given an opportunity to express an opinion before the matter is referred to Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he was sorry the issue had arisen if there are no particular problems to be settled.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

ADMIRAL INGLIS said there is a problem, namely that of priorities.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated he would like to have the situation reduced to writing.

GENERAL VANDENBEEK suggested that in view of the discussion that has been presented here, Captain Wenger prepare a brief of the entire situation to be presented to General Chamberlin for his consideration. He added that he thought the preparation of this brief should receive prompt attention.

ADMIRAL STONE said that he wanted to see the plan continued and that it can be made to work. He stated that if the Army is entertaining any reservations, however, they should be brought out and discussed.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he thought General Chamberlin should look at the Coordinator's memorandum to the Chairman, USCICC of 22 November 1946, and consider the statements made therein on (1) equality of members, (2) cutting across command channels. He said that it is the Navy's view that all members of USCIB are equal in control and interest. He commented that he suspects there has been a misunderstanding with respect to "cutting across command channels" since it was not contemplated that Colonel Hayes, for example, would go direct to NGA and issue an order to a Seaman Second Class.

COLONEL HAYES said that if there were certain missions which the Navy desires to undertake with its own facilities, he doesn't feel that the Coordinator has the authority to interfere with the accomplishment of those missions.

ADMIRAL INGLIS commented that any difficulties encountered by the Coordinator in the performance of his duties would presumably be settled by referring the problem to USCIB.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that problems arising under the Coordination Plan should be handled the way they usually are under such joint arrangements, that is, through normal command channels of the respective organizations concerned.

COLONEL HAYES said that he would like to point out again that no problems have arisen.

COMMANDER TAYLOR then cited the report of the Intercept and D/F Subcommittee on "Monitoring" which had been discussed at the last USCICC meeting, and commented that the Army members had taken issue with the word "direction" where it appears in the recommendation "that there be established under the direction of JICG . . .," and had contended that the JICG has no directive authority.

E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that in all joint arrangements the directive authority stems from the command channel from within the respective services.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that in the "shift of priority emphasis" problem, the Intelligence Division is placing itself in the position of giving directives on diplomatic missions and that it was his view that such direction rests with the State Department.

COLONEL HAYES said that this statement implies that the exploitation of diplomatic traffic is outside the military intelligence field.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that it was not outside military intelligence but was outside military operations.

MR. EDDY said that the State Department has no complaint and hopes that the Coordinator of Joint Operations plan might continue as a working arrangement.

COLONEL HAYES remarked that the State Department representative through direct contact at ASA and SA expresses the interest of the State Department in priority matters.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said he thought the State Department had experienced a difficulty in this respect in connection with the MAGIC Summary.

COLONEL CLARKE commented that, as regards priorities at ASA, if General Eisenhower directs that a certain shift be made, the facilities at ASA will be shifted to comply with the directive.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that if in making such a shift, the facilities allocated to the Army are used then this would be correct, but if other facilities are used, that is, those allocated to the Navy or to the "pool" then such procedure would be incorrect.

COLONEL CLARKE asked who, if not the respective services, determines the changes in allocation.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that changes in allocation should be accomplished in consultation with the Coordinator of Joint Operations, otherwise he did not see how the plan would work. He said that if the Coordinator is not to be consulted, then there is no need for the USCIB-USCICC organization.

COLONEL CLARKE commented that USCIB-USCICC may have outlived its usefulness.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that we stay away from principles and just get the job done.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that difficulties had arisen on the lower level which must be settled.

ADMIRAL INGLIS then asked Colonel Clarke why USCIB might have outlived its usefulness and asked whether some other organization might do the job better.

COLONEL CLARKE stated that the purpose of USCIB was to "clean our skirts" in preparation for the negotiation of the BRUSA Agreement.

ADMIRAL INGLIS disagreed and COLONEL CLARKE cited the original correspondence which led to the formalization of the USCIB-USCICC organization.

CAPTAIN WENGER read excerpts from the minutes of early ANCIB meetings to show that ANCIB was also established for other purposes than negotiation of the BRUSA Agreement.

COLONEL HAYES stated that Colonel Clarke's position is correct in that one of the principal reasons for the formalization of USCIB was to present a united U.S. front in dealing with the British.

ADMIRAL INGLIS commented that this was certainly not the only reason.

COLONEL CLARKE, commenting on a U.S.-Canadian C.I. agreement, said that if we go out of business with the British, then USCIB should be abolished.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that this is not the opinion of the Chief of Staff of the Army since without USCIB there would be unwarranted duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy.

COLONEL CLARKE said that, in the cryptanalytic field the service that would have intimate knowledge of a problem must work on that problem, therefore, there would be no unwarranted duplication between the Army and the Navy in the C.I. field.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked, how, in the absence of USCIB, would the Army or the Navy ascertain the interests of the State Department.

COLONEL CLARKE said that this would be handled as it had been before the inception of the USCIB-USCICC organization, that is, by direct consultation with the State Department.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN again requested that this entire problem be reduced to writing so that it could be studied.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

ADMIRAL STONE said that he didn't think USCIB should be abolished and that the members should start thinking of the organization in light of the Eisenhower-Miritz correspondence, and added that he would like to have the problem of the authority of the Coordinator fully discussed and settled.

MR. EDDY said that he would like to second this suggestion and that whatever the authority of the Coordinator is determined to be, he would regret any diminution of this joint C.I. effort and believed that USCIB should be continued.

DECISION: USCIB agreed that Captain Wenger will prepare a study of the evolution of the USCIB-USCICC organization and the Army-Navy C.I. Coordination Plan for presentation to General Chamberlin for his consideration. Further discussion of this item was deferred until the next meeting of USCIB.

Discussion of U.S.-Canadian C.I. Agreement.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he would like to have USCIB's ideas on how the deadlock on the question of the U.S.-Canadian C.I. Agreement can be broken. He said that the Army is not prepared to present its side of the issue and asked if a date could be set for a final discussion.

COLONEL HAYES said that he did not agree that the Army has not presented its position, because the Army had, six months ago, made known its reasons for opposing a written agreement.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he had already given written approval of the recommendations submitted by USCICC in its study of the problem.

COLONEL HAYES recalled that a decision had been reached by USCICC that a U.S.-Canadian C.I. Agreement is not necessary at this time.

ADMIRAL INGLIS commented that all seemed to agree that BRUSA should not be terminated, but the question seemed to be whether there should be U.S.-Canadian collaboration without a written agreement.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked if there has been any commitment to Canada with regard to a formal agreement and stated that if such a commitment had been made, he might change his opinion.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that whether there has been a previous commitment is beside the point and that the basic question relates to securing the necessary protection for U.S. interests.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked for reasons why there should be a written U.S.-Canadian C.I. agreement.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said there were two reasons he could think of off hand why there definitely should be such an agreement:

1. Any oral agreement between the United States and Canada is apt to be misunderstood and certainly open to interpretation by our successors.

2. Certain reservations with regard to the use of C.I. material should be established; for example, (a) collateral information from the State Department should not be furnished; (b) certain U.S. methods and techniques should not be the subject of exchange; (c) restrictions on the use of C.I. material for commercial advantage should be set forth especially on C.I. material relating to countries with which the U.S. and Canada are in trade competition; (d) security safeguards and regulations must be agreed upon.

ADMIRAL INGLIS reiterated his opinion that if these matters are left to an oral agreement, misunderstanding will result. He said that Colonel Hayes has stated that Canada is bound to the United Kingdom and the United States, therefore, doesn't need an agreement with Canada, but that the Navy does not consider this arrangement to afford the necessary safeguards. He said that in his mind everything points to the need for an agreement and that he cannot see why an agreement in this case is objectionable. He said that the Army members may not see any need but there certainly seems to be no reason for them to object to having one. He concluded by saying that the national policy is to strengthen Canada in all fields.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said a written agreement is not so important except for the fact that the Navy's desire to contribute to the Canadian C.I. effort depends on having such an agreement.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked what the State Department's feeling is on the subject.

MR. EDDY said that the State Department has no strong feeling either way.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked for the views of the FBI representative.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

MR. TAMM said that from the discussion today and from his previous knowledge of Canadian relations, he favors a written agreement. He said that he had been particularly impressed by the Chairman's statement on being realistic and that he thinks direct dealing with Canada is better than allowing U.S. products to be passed to Canada indirectly through Great Britain. He said that past dealings between the Bureau and Canada have been on a very high plane and that he has been impressed with Canada's sincerity, energy, and fundamental desire to give more than they get.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that the War Department will reexamine its position in the matter.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the Chairman is in a difficult position as regards the Crean request, adding that the Canadians are wondering at the delay in being given an answer.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would feel a little differently on the issue if the Canadians had made specific requests.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that all dealings with Canada have been deferred pending a decision on this matter and that as it stands, he, as Chairman, can tell Canada only that USCIB is in sympathy with their request but that the Canadians possibly are becoming restless and anxious for a decision on their requests.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked what authority exists for the collaboration between the United States and Canada that has already taken place.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the original justification was wartime expediency and that he had as an interim measure, agreed to continue collaboration on the four tasks assigned to Canada and had agreed to the addition of one Bourbon task but that he would not go further than that without a written agreement and that he would not continue indefinitely on these five without an agreement.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked if negotiating an agreement with Canada means that USCIB will also have agreements with other members of the British Commonwealth.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said no, that the question of whether Great Britain should be put on notice that USCIB does not consider Great Britain's revelation to other members of the British Commonwealth of the existence of the BRUSA Agreement to be strictly in accordance with the terms of that agreement, is another point.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN inquired if this matter had not been the subject of a USCICC recommendation and recalled that he had approved the USCICC study in which it had been recommended that a written U.S.-Canadian C.I. Agreement is not necessary at this time.

COLONEL HAYES stated that the USCICC study had made such a recommendation.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that whatever USCICC had recommended he does not agree that a written agreement is not necessary at this time.

GENERAL VANDENBERG remarked that he must meet Mr. Crean again the next day and that it is becoming increasingly difficult to postpone the USCIB answer to the Canadian request.

COLONEL HAYES stated that he thought that USCIB had agreed on the answer that was to be given to Mr. Crean.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that Admiral Inglis' agreement with the answer which was to be given Mr. Crean was contingent on the negotiation of a written C.I. agreement.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that the Chairman, USCIB tell the Canadian representative, Mr. Crean, that Canada is free to ask for what she wants.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that Canada has already requested more than he is willing to give without a written agreement.

COLONEL HAYES remarked that only the Navy members object to the recommendations contained in the USCICC study on this problem.

ADMIRAL STONE stated that the Navy members should not be put in this light. He said that he cannot see why the Army members object to a written agreement.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he is willing to give Canada what it asks for now if we tell Canada that an agreement is being drafted.

MR. EDDY said that he thought it was agreed at the last meeting of USCIB that Canada would be given certain materials and aids for the exploitation of assigned cryptographic tasks and an agreement would be drafted and held in readiness for future need.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that, at this point, he was sure that the Chairman would have little further in the way of a decision on which to base his conversations with Mr. Crean on the following day. He said that he would like both sides to reexamine their respective positions.

ADMIRAL STONE commented that both the Army and the Navy have agreements with Canada in other fields and that he wondered why there should be objection to a U.S.-Canadian agreement in the C.I. field.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN remarked that the Communications Intelligence field is usually an exception and the War Department will not agree to a U.S.-Canadian C.I. agreement unless such an agreement is absolutely necessary.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then asked if the Navy members would agree to the drafting of a U.S.-Canadian agreement to be held in readiness until the occasion arises which necessitates its being put into effect.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that such an occasion has already arisen.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked what Canada wants.

COMMANDER TAYLOR stated that Canada wants to be able to ask for any CREAM material which she considers pertinent to her interests with the assurance that her request will be granted.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that the Canadian representative had come to him, as the Chairman of USCIB, for this assurance that Canada will not be rebuffed if it requests such information.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN remarked that, in other words, Canada wanted the U.S. to completely "open the gates" to U.S. Communication Intelligence and he asked whether the agreement would provide for this.

ADMIRAL INGLIS commented that the agreement has certain limitations on the way such information can be used.

COLONEL HAYES stated that it had long ago been suggested that a U.S.-Canadian C.I. agreement might be drafted to cover only the dissemination and security aspects. He said that his principal objection was not on security but on the extra work that would be involved in bringing Canada in as a major partner. He added that it might be possible to extract from the BRUSA Agreement those paragraphs covering use for commercial advantage, security, dissemination, etc.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that this possibility be studied and discussed at a subsequent meeting.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that Captain Wenger and Colonel Hayes make a study of this aspect of the problem. He then asked if the Canadians have a copy of the BRUSA Agreement.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that Canada claims that she does not have the BRUSA Agreement but he is quite sure that they know, in general, its terms. He added that, in his opinion, the fact that Great Britain has made available to Canada the terms of the BRUSA Agreement is a violation of that agreement.

COMMANDER TAYLOR commented that Canada might well go to Great Britain for the desired information if they can't get it from the U.S.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that as an offhand opinion, he does not believe it advisable for any U.S.-Canadian C.I. agreement to make reference to the BRUSA Agreement.

COLONEL HAYES stated that he thought the necessary assurances with respect to dissemination and security, etc., could be had without making any reference to the BRUSA Agreement.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that Captain Wenger and Colonel Hayes should get together and prepare a draft U.S.-Canadian Agreement which would embody only the dissemination and security provisions deemed to be necessary, which draft should then be submitted to the Army and Navy members of the Board for comment or approval. He added that CIG would be willing to accept the judgment of the Army-Navy members in this matter and would give approval in advance to a U.S.-Canadian C.I. Agreement acceptable to the Army and Navy.

MR. EDDY said that such an arrangement would be acceptable to the State Department.

MR. TAMI said that the FBI will accept the consensus of Board opinion in the matter.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN gave his approval of General Vandenberg's suggestion.

ADMIRAL INGLIS and ADMIRAL STONE also approved the suggestion and after further discussion it was agreed that Captain Wenger and Colonel Hayes would prepare a mutually acceptable draft U.S.-Canadian C.I. Agreement which would then be presented to their respective USCIB superiors for approval and, if approved by them, would be considered as approved by all members and would be circulated to all members as a fait accompli.

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

COLONEL CLARKE stated his belief that the adoption of this suggestion will set a bad precedent insofar as the mode of Board approval is concerned.

DECISION: Colonel Hayes and Captain Wenger will draft a mutually agreeable U.S. Canadian C.I. Agreement and obtain the approval of their respective superiors on USCIB. This document, as approved by the above-named parties, is to serve as an approved working draft for negotiations with Canada and will cover security, dissemination, and restrictions on the use of communication intelligence for commercial advantage. The version of the instrument which is approved by the Army and Navy members of USCIB is to be considered approved ipso facto by the other members of USCIB and will be circulated to other USCIB members as a fait accompli.

The meeting adjourned at 1725 hours.

Respectfully,

WASON G. CAMPBELL
G. T. R. ADAMS
Secretariat, USCIB

~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~